[In Lak'esh]

By 1934 the Jesuits had finally accomplished their tremendous quest of taxing the wages of the largest and most productive labor market in the world. What a bonanza of monies began to flow into the coffers of the U.S. Treasury, which in turn, paid the Black Pope’s Federal Reserve Bank extending its monopoly credit to the U.S. Congress---with interest!

Further, with regard to wages being “income” within the meaning of the many decisions of the federal courts, we will notice but three. In United States v. Becker, 965 F.2d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 1992) the court found defendant’s contention that wages are not income to be “ridiculous.” In United States v. Connor, 898 F.2d 942, 943-44 (3rd Cir.) cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029 (1990), the court stated that “[e]very court which has ever considered the issue has unequivocally rejected the argument that wages are not income.” In United States v. White, 769 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1985), the court issued a permanent injunction to prevent the promotion of the argument that there is no tax imposed on an exchange of property (labor) in an equal exchange for property (wages). In Clark v. United States, 211 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1954), the court held
“Of course, gross income and not gross receipts, is the foundation of income tax liability, for it is only earnings [wages], profits and gains which the statute subjects to tax. (See 4 USC 110C.)”

Please notice the date of these cases, all of which are SUBSEQUENT to the passing of HJR-192 in 1933. This author knows of no cases decided by any federal court in which the definition of “income” was included to be wages UNTIL AFTER 1933!

Indeed, “wages” are “income,” but wages have not been defined by the courts to be “profit or gain from a source,” which definition of “income” has been given by the Supreme Court since the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. As to “wages” not being “profit or gain,” we read in Oliver v. Halstead, 196 Va 992; 86 S.E.2d 858 (1955):

“There is a clear distinction between ‘profit’ and ‘wages’ or compensation for labor. Compensation from labor cannot be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law. The word ‘profit’ as ordinarily used, means the gain made upon any business or investment---a different thing altogether from mere compensation for labor.”

And finally, we read in Laureldale Cemetery Association v. Matthews, 354 Pa. 239; 47A.2d 277, 280; 86 S.E. at 859:

“Reasonable compensation for labor or services rendered is not profit.”

It is absolutely imperative to understand that “wages” or “compensation for labor” is not “profit and gain.” But “wages,” or “earnings” in exchange for labor, as well as “profit and gain” are both “income” and thus subject to the “income tax” imposed by the Sixteenth Amendment—only as of 1933. All “income” of those persons, natural and artificial, receiving “profit and gain” from a “source” in privilege, were subject to income taxation as per the Sixteenth Amendment evidenced by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad., 240 US 1 (1916), and Eisner v. Macomber, 252 US 189 (1920). But in 1933, with the passage of HJR-192, “wages” or “earnings” became—by OPERATION OF LAW—“income,” as every federal court decision has determined since that date. (There has never been a law passed by Congress and codified into Title 26 (the Internal Revenue Code) that requires the individual laborer to pay an “income tax” on his wages.) Thus, the Jesuit Order used HJR-192 to EXTEND THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT’S power to tax “income” to include “wages.” The taxation of wages was never the OPEN intent of that amendment! That SECRET extension of power was carried out by Congress and thus carries with it the force of law—as every federal district judge knows.

In conclusion, there are two great defenses against the government attempting to tax the wages of the day laborer. The first defense is that no law has ever been passed by Congress and codified into the Internal Revenue Code that requires an individual worker to pay an income tax on his wages. (There really needs to be no law for the government to tax our wages since HJR-192 secretly and yet legally EXTENDED the power of the Sixteenth Amendment to do so. To this, the government will never admit; so the defense that “there is no law” is proving to be a winner. The 50,000 dollar (Federal Reserve Note) reward still stands for anyone who can find the Act of Congress, codified into the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26), that authorizes an income tax on the wages of the nation’s laborers.

The second defense is the Fifth Amendment provision, that no person can be compelled to be a witness against himself in any criminal proceeding. Since the information provided on a 1040 tax return can be used against the filer in a criminal prosecution, one cannot be compelled to assess himself at an IRS Summons or file a tax return, which argument has also proved to be a winner many times. The IRS/DOJ knows this for which reason the annual giving of personal financial information on a 1040 form is called “voluntary compliance.” If the IRS proceeds civilly against a non-filer for refusing to obey an IRS personal Summons (as the taxpayer or non-taxpayer is not compelled to attend said summons pursuant to the Schulz doctrine (2005)), the case should be dismissed. Why? Because the government has “failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” if the Defendant in the IRS/DOJ’s attempted civil enforcement procedure pleads these two defenses given above in his “motion to dismiss.”

I trust this has been of benefit. I await your comments.

Eric John Phelps